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J. Bradford De Long 
Before the Great Depression the U.S. government did not have a fiscal policy, 
at least not in the sense that economists have meant for the past two genera- 
tions. The government did not attempt to tune its deficit or surplus to achieve 
the goal of full employment or low inflation. This is not to say that the federal 
budget was typically in balance. The federal government did borrow, and bor- 
row on a very large scale in wartime: a typical pre-World  War I1 war would end 
with total federal debt equal to some three-tenths of a year’s national product. 
But after a typical war was over the debt would rapidly be redeemed: the 
War of  1812 debt had been paid off by the 1830s. The Mexican War debt had 
been extinguished by the early 1850s. The enormous Civil War debt and the 
less enormous Spanish-American War debt had been extinguished by  the eve 
of World War I. Thus U.S. “fiscal policy” before the Great Depression was 
simple: the federal government borrowed what it could  during wartime.  It 
strove thereafter to run peacetime surpluses to reduce the ratio of debt to na- 
tional product. All this changed with the Great Depression. 
The first depression-era federal deficits were involuntary: both Herbert Hoo- 
ver and (in his first term at least) Franklin Roosevelt tried to achieve balanced 
budgets. But they each failed to find politically feasible policies that could 
pass the Congress and would balance the budget. Later depression-era federal 
deficits were more voluntary: the government came to make a virtue out of 
necessity and to trumpet the potential macroeconomic benefits of a depression 
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deficit. Thus the US. government abandoned the principle that the only good 
peacetime budget was a balanced budget. And the depression-era deficits were 
continued and vastly expanded during World War 11. 
The shadow cast by  the Great Depression prevented a return to the prede- 
pression principle of budget balance after World War 11: the political economic 
folk wisdom, not completely wrong, was that addiction to budget balance had 
deepened the depression. But what was to replace the predepression commit- 
ment to peacetime balance as an operational goal? 
For the first generation or so after World War 11, economists’ and politicians’ 
views appeared to be converging on a possible consensus, a position that had 
been set out by the Committee on Economic Development (CED) under the 
intellectual leadership of  future Nixon-era Council of  Economic Advisers 
(CEA) chair Herbert Stein.’ 
The CED position was to set tax rates and expenditure programs so that the 
budget would be in surplus or in balance at high employment (whichever was 
desired) but to leave unhindered the operation of  the “automatic stabilizers” 
set in motion as recession causes revenues to fall, spending to rise, and the 
budget to swing into deficit. These automatic stabilizers take effect within a 
single  calendar  quarter,  as  claims  for  unemployment insurance  and  food 
stamps are filed and as tax withholdings are received (or not received) by  the 
Federal Reserve system. They reduce the sensitivity of  aggregate demand to 
shifts in autonomous spending or monetary velocity, thus diminishing the mag- 
nitude of cyclical fluctuations. And they operate much more quickly than dis- 
cretionary fiscal policies or shifts in monetary policy can-thus  they are an 
irreplaceable tool of macroeconomic management. 
But neither Herbert Stein’s nor any other principle managed to become the 
basis of an enduring consensus. And no logic can be seen in the pattern of U.S. 
fiscal policy across decades: whatever logic might have been seen vanished 
with the emergence of long-term “structural” deficits during the 1980s under 
Ronald Reagan’s presidency, and with the appearance of very long term projec- 
tions of large deficits as a social insurance system designed before 1973 col- 
lided with slower real revenue after the  1973 beginning of  the productivity 
slowdown (see Auerbach 1994). 
This paper traces, first, the breakdown of  the predepression consensus on 
fiscal rectitude under the pressure of  the depression. It then  considers the 
shadow cast by  the memory of  the depression on post-World  War  I1 fiscal 
policy, as economists, bureaucrats, and politicians struggled to learn the right 
lessons from the depression. 
It concludes on a note of pessimism: pressures on the US. fiscal balance are 
strong, political understanding of the benefits of alternative policies are weak, 
and the attention span of the political system is short. Even though the consen- 
1. Stein’s The Fiscal Revolution in America: Policy in Pursuit of  Reality  was and remains a 
classic. 69  Fiscal Policy in the Shadow of the Great Depression 
sus of economists has provided and will continue to provide good advice, fiscal 
policy in the future is likely to display a similar lack of logic and have similar 
damaging effects on the economy as in the recent past. 
2.1  Predepression Fiscal Policy 
2.1.1  Peacetime Surpluses 
Before the Great Depression, the idea that the government should tune its 
fiscal policy to control and moderate the business cycle was far from the center 
of political and economic discourse. The government did borrow, but its bor- 
rowings were confined to wartime. Wartime borrowings were large relative to 
the size of the economy: wars are very expensive. The Revolutionary War debt 
assumed by Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton amounted to perhaps one- 
fifth of the then-United  States’ annual national product. The Civil War debt 
accumulated under Treasury Secretary Salmon Chase and the World War I debt 
borrowed under Treasury Secretary William G.  McAdoo each amounted to 
roughly three-tenths of annual national product (see fig. 2.1). 
But after the wars were over, the debt invariably shrank as a share of national 
product. Some of the debt was retired by budget surpluses. The remaining debt, 
constant in nominal terms, shrank relative to GDP because of real per capita 
income growth, population growth, and inflation. 
The Revolutionary War debt (both that issued under the Articles of Confed- 
eration and that assumed from the states on Hamilton’s initiative) had been 
reduced from roughly 20 to perhaps 5 percent of  national product by  the eve 
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Fig. 2.1  Federal debt as a share of national product 
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Fig. 2.2  Budget surplus (or deficit) as a share of national product 
Sources: U.S.  Bureau of the Census (1975) and CEA (1996). 
1820s, and President Andrew Jackson paid off virtually the entire national debt 
in the 1830s. The small debt run up during the Mexican War was similarly 
erased by the end of the 1850s. 
The  large  Civil  War  debt  and  the  small  (relative to  national  product) 
Spanish-American War debt were similarly paid off over the decades: the ratio 
of federal debt to national product was less than 3 percent on the eve of World 
War I. The pattern was the same after World War I. The decade of the 1920s 
saw a near halving of the federal debt as a share of national product. 
Before the Great Depression there were peacetime decades-the  192Os, the 
1880s, and the 1820s-in  which the nominal federal budget was in surplus to 
the extent of 2 percent of national product or so. There were peacetime decades 
in which the nominal federal budget was in rough balance, and in which the 
growth of per capita income, the growth of population, and (usually) the slow 
progress of inflation reduced the relative size of the debt measured as a share 
of  national product. There were no peacetime decades in which the federal 
budget was in more than trivial deficit (see fig. 2.2). 
2.1.2  Ideologies and Doctrines 
The rationale for the predepression consensus against countercyclical fiscal 
policy had at least five facets. First came a fear of the impact of large federal 
debts on the economic health of the country. A large debt meant large interest 
payments to service the debt. Relatively large interest payments to service the 
debt required high taxes-and,  perhaps, a significant excess burden, especially 
given the limited record-keeping capacities of  pre-twentieth-century govem- 
ments and thus the limited range of taxes that they could effectively administer. 71  Fiscal Policy in the Shadow of the Great Depression 
Adam Smith, for example, surveyed the rising trend in war-induced debts, 
writing that rising debt as a share of national product “has gradually enfeebled 
every state which has adopted it. . . . Spain seems to have learned the practice 
from the Italian republicks, and (its taxes being probably less judicious than 
theirs) it has, in proportion to its natural strength, been still more enfeebled. . . . 
[The same is true of] France . . . [and] the United Provinces [of the Nether- 
lands]” ([  17761 1937,880-81). 
Smith believed that the conclusion of this “progress of the enormous debts” 
was “probably ruin.” He showed little patience with those who argued that the 
eighteenth-century British Empire need not fear the economic consequences 
of the accumulation of debt:*  “Another war . . .  may . . .  render the British sys- 
tem of taxation as oppressive as that of Holland, or even as that of  Spain. . . . 
Let us not. . .  rashly conclude that [the British economy] is capable of support- 
ing any burden; nor even be too confident that she could support without great 
distress a burden a little greater” ([1776] 1937, 881). 
Second came a fear of the political consequences of a high national debt. 
The government becomes more concerned with keeping its debt holders happy 
when the ratio of debt to national-product is high. It fears the consequences of 
capital flight: the government becomes, in a sense, the property of  its debt 
holders when this ratio rises. Perhaps followers of Alexander Hamilton were 
not unhappy with the idea of a government whose every step was taken with a 
worried backward glance to see whether it pleased the bondholders. But fol- 
lowers of Thomas Jefferson or Andrew Jackson were very unhappy. 
Third-and  perhaps most important-was  that few believed that deficits in 
recession would be successful stabilization policy. Running a peacetime deficit 
to try to alleviate a recession would increase the tax burden, depress production 
and wealth in the long run, and reinforce dangerous tendencies in politics, and 
it would fail to boost employment and production in the short run. 
One important reason to doubt that deficits would be effective at fighting 
recessions was the operation of the pre-World  War I gold standard. Under the 
prevailing international monetary system-the  gold standard-capital  flowed 
freely across national borders. To a first approximation, the domestic interest 
rate was set in world markets: equal to the world interest rate plus whatever 
risk premium international investors demanded for placing their wealth in the 
home country,  Thus, there seemed to be little reason to think that deficits would 
be a powerful stimulative policy. First, deficits reduce the net supply of loan- 
able funds to the private market: money borrowed by  the government is not 
available to be loaned to business. Second, deficits might well increase-per- 
haps sharply increase-the  risk premium investors would demand for lending 
their capital on the domestic market. 
The net effect? Ifprivate domestic demand for loanable funds is inelastic, 
2.  On the British political military state, see Brewer (1990). Also relevant is De Long and 
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Fig. 2.3  Effect of deficit spending on demand and supply of investment funds 
under the gold standard 
and ifthe shift in the risk premium charged by overseas investors is small, then 
it might be that the sum of private investment and public spending if the deficit- 
spending program were undertaken would be larger than  otherwise. But it 
might not. And there was no theoretical presumption that it would (see fig. 2.3). 
Indeed, these fears made coherent sense in an impeccably Keynesian frame- 
work: that of Keynes’s (1936) General Theory.  Stein quotes Keynes that deficit 
spending “may have the effect of  increasing the rate of interest, and so re- 
tarding investment . . . whilst . . . the increased cost of capital goods will re- 
duce their marginal efficiency. . . . With the confused psychology that often 
prevails, the Government programme may through its effects on ‘confidence’ 
increase liquidity-preference or diminish the marginal efficency of  capital” 
(quoted in Stein 1969, 36-37). And economists working in the Keynesian tra- 
dition have at times argued that deficit spending is not expansionary. Consider 
Alan Blinder’s claim that the 1993  fiscal policy contraction in the United States 
boosted production and employment: “The remarkable decline in long-term 
interest rates from the fall of  1992 to the fall of  1993 is what kick-started a 
previously lackluster economic recovery into sustained growth. Remember. . . 73  Fiscal Policy in the Shadow of the Great Depression 
that the bond market rallied with no change in monetary policy. Does anyone 
seriously  doubt  that  the  Clinton  administration’s large,  credible,  deficit- 
reduction plan of 1993 was the driving force behind the lower long-term inter- 
est  rate^?"^ The predepression fears that fiscal policy multipliers could be zero 
or negative were real fears. 
Overinvestment Theories 
A fourth argument against countercyclical fiscal policy was not that it would 
not work but that it would-and  that depressions were good for you. Many 
economists explained the business cycle in general and the Great Depression 
in  particular  as  consequences  of  “overinvestment.” For  example,  Joseph 
Schumpeter, writing from Harvard in the middle of  the Great  Depression, 
claimed that there was a “presumption against remedial [stimulative policy] 
measures [because] policies of  this class produce additional trouble for the 
future. . . . [Depressions are] not simply evils, which we might attempt to sup- 
press, but . . . forms of something which has to be done, namely, adjustment to 
change . . . [and] most of what would be effective in remedying a depression 
would be equally effective in preventing this adjustment” (quoted in Brown et 
al. 1934, 138). 
In what Haberler (1937) classified as “monetary overinvestment” theories of 
the business cycle, depressions were born either because of excessively easy 
monetary policy or because of ex post overoptimistic  expectations of economic 
growth. When monetary policy ceased to be easy, or when investors and busi- 
nesses recognized that their forecasts of future growth had been overoptimistic, 
the economy was left with a large inventory of investment projects that were 
unprofitable. 
True and sustainable economic recovery was not possible until the econo- 
my’s overinvestment overhang had been ‘‘liquidated’’-and  the painful depres- 
sion was this process of liquidation. Monetary and fiscal policies to moderate 
the depression would, in this conceptual framework, keep workers and firms 
producing in unsustainable lines of  business and levels of  capital intensity. 
Such attempts to alleviate the depression would make the depression less deep 
only at the price of making it longer and would add to the total sum of human 
misery (Hayek 1935). 
Indeed, economists like Lionel Robbins (1934) went as far as to blame the 
tiny steps toward moderating the decline in the money stock and boosting fiscal 
demand that governments undertook over 1929-33  for the persistence of the 
Great Depression into the mid- 1930s. 
Limits to Predepression Action 
Fifth came yet another reason to be skeptical about predepression countercy- 
clical fiscal policy: the problem of implementation. How might the government 
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Fig. 2.4  Federal revenues and expenditures as shares of national product 
Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975) and CEA (1996). 
manage to spend money in a timely fashion on a large enough scale to do any 
significant good? It is not clear how the predepression federal government 
could have used the budget as a tool of business cycle management, even if it 
had very strongly wanted to (see fig. 2.4). 
Before World War I, federal receipts and expenditures were roughly 3 per- 
cent of  national product. To  obtain the same magnitude of  fiscal “automatic 
stabilizers” that we have today-when  a $70 billion fall in annual national 
product is associated with a $26 billion dollar increase in the federal deficit- 
would in pre-World  War I circumstances require that the government respond 
to a recession carrying with it a 4 percentage point increase in the rate of unem- 
ployment by either doubling federal spending or eliminating taxation entirely. 
Fiscal policy can be stabilizing only if government spending is large enough 
to act as a plausible sea anchor for aggregate demand. 
2.2  Fiscal Policy during the Depression 
2.2.1  Striving for Budget Balance 
Before the Great Depression, the government’s first instinct when the econ- 
omy turned down was to do nothing. President Hoover sought to break this 
pattern. He stressed that he did assume a governmental responsibility to fight 
the depression-in  sharp contrast to many others in his own party. He reserved 
special scorn for his own economic policy team, whom he termed the “  ‘leave 
it alone liquidationists’ headed by Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon, 
who felt that government must keep its hands off and let the slump liquidate 75  Fiscal Policy in the Shadow of the Great Depression 
itself. Mr. Mellon had only one formula: ‘Liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, 
liquidate the farmers, liquidate real estate.’ He insisted that, when the people 
get an inflation brainstorm, the only way to get it out of their blood is to let it 
collapse . . .  even a panic was not altogether a bad thing” (1952, 3: 30).4 
But Hoover’s idea of how activist government policy should fight the Great 
Depression was for the government to make sure that its budget remained in 
surplus. Hoover sought tax increases because “our major sources of revenues, 
income taxes and corporation profits, were going out from under us with ap- 
palling speed. . . . National stability required that we balance the budget. To 
do this, we had to increase taxes on the one hand and, on the other, to reduce 
drastically government expenditures” (1952, 3: 1  32).5 
Thus Hoover’s December 1931 State of the Union message called for strin- 
gent action to balance the budget: 
Our first step toward recovery is to reestablish confidence and thus restore 
the flow of credit, which is the very basis of our economic life. 
The first requirement of confidence and of economic recovery is financial 
stability of the United States government. 
Even with increased taxation, the Government will reach the utmost safe 
limit of its borrowing capacity by the expenditures for which we are already 
obligated.. . . To  go further than these limits . . . will destroy confidence, 
denude commerce and industry of their resources, jeopardize the financial 
system, and actually extend unemployment. (Hoover 1952, 3: 132-33) 
From our perspective, Hoover’s fears appear wrongheaded. The federal debt 
at the end of World War I had been nearly twice as large as a share of GDP as 
at the end of  the  1920s. There was no sign in higher interest rates that the 
government had reached the “ultimate safe limit” of its borrowing capacity.6 
Moreover,  reasons  that  led  monetary  economists to  fear  deficit  spending 
quickly vanished during the depression. What could do more to discourage 
4. Four paragraphs later, Hoover insists that “Secretary Mellon was not hard-hearted.” 
5. Hoover seems to have assumed the worst about the motives and aims of his political adversar- 
ies-both  politicians in Washington and grassroots demonstrators and advocates: whether Demo- 
crats “set in their determination to delay recovery”; “old-guard Republican leaders in the Senate 
and the House . . . defeated in their Presidential ambition in  1928 .  . . [who] certainly did not 
exert themselves energetically in their traditional duty to counterattack and expose [Democratic 
political] misrepresentations”; or bonus marchers seeking early payment of the World War I veter- 
ans’ bonus, “organized and promoted by the Communists [who] included a large number of hood- 
lums and ex-convicts . .  . frequently addressed by  Democratic Congressmen seeking to inflame 
them  against  me  . . . given financial  support by  some of  the publishers  of  the  sensationalist 
press.. . . 5,000 mixed hoodlums, ex-convicts, Communists, and a minority of veterans” (1952, 
3: 225-26). 
6. Herbert Stein sees two causes of Hoover’s campaign to raise taxes and balance the budget in 
1932. The first is that “Hoover and his close advisers had prejudices in favor of balancing the 
budget.” The second is the combination of the “gold outflow of 1931 [following Britain’s abandon- 
ment of the gold standard,] . . . rising interest rates, falling bond prices, increasing bank suspen- 
sions,” all of which led some solidity to Hoover’s fears. 76  J. Bradford De Long 
private investment than the 8 percent per year deflation seemover 1929-33?  To 
where could capital flee when other countries were likely to devalue further 
than the United States? 
Republicans were not alone in seeking budget balance: recall that Franklin 
Roosevelt made Hoover’s inability to balance the federal budget during the 
depression a campaign issue in 1932. And the overinvestment doctrine-that 
in the long run the Great Depression would turn out to have been “good medi- 
cine” for the economy and that proponents of stimulative monetary and fiscal 
policies in the 1930s were shortsighted enemies of the public welfare-drew 
relatively broad support. 
There were proponents of government action to expand demand in the Great 
Depression. Keynes tried to ridicule the “overinvestment” view, which Salant 
(1989) terms the “crime and punishment” view  of  business  cycle^.^  Ralph 
Hawtrey, an advisor to the British Treasury and the Bank of England, called it 
the equivalent of “crying, ‘Fire! Fire!’ in Noah’s  flood’ (1938, 145; see also 
Temin 1989).  Much later, Milton Friedman would recall that at Chicago, where 
he went to graduate school, such dangerous nonsense was not taught-but  he 
would speculate that perhaps the presence of such doctrines at other universi- 
ties like Harvard was what induced otherwise bright economists to rebel and 
become Keynesians (see Gordon 1972). 
But President Hoover, at least, swallowed the claim that the Great Depres- 
sion was due to overinvestment brought about by  the Federal Reserve’s sup- 
posed “credit inflation” of the late 1920s hook, line, and sinker. Never mind 
that Friedman and Schwartz (1963) find no sign of too-loose monetary policy 
in the  1920s, as both monetary aggregates and prices followed their normal 
long-run growth path. Never mind that economic historians like Jeffrey Miron 
have argued that the Federal Reserve in the 1920s was too contractionary and 
set the Great Depression in motion by its attempts to cool off the economy out 
of the fear that the stock market boom of the 1920s  reflected “overspeculation.” 
Hoover had  no doubt that  a Federal Reserve governed by  “political ap- 
pointee[~]  . . .  utterly devoid of global economic or banking sense . . .  medioc- 
rities . . .  mental annex[es] to Europe” had set the Great Depression in motion 
by not causing absolute deflation in the 1920s. He came close to calling for the 
7. From Keynes: 
Some austere and puritanical souls regard [the Great Depression] both as an inevitable and a 
desirable nemesis on so much [late 1920~1  overexpansion, as they call it; a nemesis on man’s 
speculative spirit. It would, they feel, be  a victory for the mammon of unrighteousness  if so 
much prosperity was not subsequently balanced by universal bankruptcy. We  need, they say, 
what they politely call a “prolonged liquidation” to put us right. The liquidation, they tell us, is 
not yet complete. But in time it will be.  And when sufficient time has elapsed for the completion 
of the liquidation, all will be well with us again. . . .  I do not take this view. I find the explanation 
of the current business losses, of the reduction in output, and of the unemployment which neces- 
sarily ensues not in the high level of investment which was proceeding up to the spring of 1929, 
but in the subsequent cessation of this investment. I see no hope of  a recovery except in a revival 
of  the high level of  investment. And I do not understand how universal bankruptcy can do any 
good or bring us nearer to prosperity. ([1931] 1973, 349) 77  Fiscal Policy in the Shadow of the Great Depression 
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Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975) and CEA (1996). 
execution of his entire Federal Reserve Board, ending the section in his Mem- 
oirs dealing with  1920s Federal Reserve policy with the accusatory: “There 
are crimes far worse than murder, for which men should be reviled and pun- 
ished” (1952, 3: 9, 14). 
2.2.2  Depression-Era Deficits 
If Herbert Hoover regarded his presidency as a success or failure depending 
on whether he managed to keep the budget balanced, his presidency was a 
failure. The federal budget swung from substantial surplus at the start of Hoo- 
ver’s presidency into a deficit of 3 percent of GDP or more-partly  as a result 
of  congressional override of Hoover’s veto of the veterans’ bonus; partly as a 
result of “extraordinary” relief expenditures; and mostly as a result of the col- 
lapse in the nominal collections of a relatively progressive tax system, as real 
national income and the price level fell in the slide into the Great Depression. 
Figure 2.5 shows the pattern of deficits and official unemployment rates dur- 
ing the interwar period. The 1920s see relatively low official unemployment, 
in the 3-8  percent range, with government surpluses established to reduce the 
World War I debt in the range of approximately 1 percent of national product. 
By contrast, the 1930s see unemployment in the 15-25  percent range. And the 
federal deficit varies from near 1 up to 6 percent of national product. 
Swings in the deficit associated with swings in the unemployment rate in 
the interwar period are substantial. On average, a 5 percentage point increase 
in the unemployment rate is associated with a 1.6 percentage point increase in 
the deficit, measured as a share of actual national product. 
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were by  and large involuntary The collapse of nominal revenues outran the 
ability of the executive branch to propose, and the Congress to enact, cuts in 
expenditures. The deficit rose in spite of discretionary fiscal policy action, due 
to the operation of the automatic stabilizers built into the government’s budget. 
By automatic stabilizers economists mean the natural tendency of revenues 
to  fall-and  for entitlement social welfare spending to rise-in  a recession. 
As businesses lay off workers and lose profits, tax collections fall. As more 
people apply for relief programs of various kinds, expenditures rise. This “au- 
tomatic” swing in the federal budget generates a shift toward a deficit that 
“stabilizes” the economy. It cushions the fall in disposable income that accom- 
panies a recession, helps keep consumption from falling, and  reduces the 
Keynesian multiplier. 
It has become conventional to conceptually divide fiscal policy into two 
parts: first, the operation of  the automatic stabilizers that swing into action 
without any legislated changes in spending programs or tax schedules; second, 
changes in legislated policy that affect what the government surplus or deficit 
would be if economic activity were unchanged relative to potential output. This 
second component is usually measured by the full-employment deficit-what 
the federal deficit would be if the economy was near “full employment” (see 
fig. 2.6). 
Such estimates of the full-employment deficit are hazardous for the period 
of the depression. They require extrapolating tax collections and spending pro- 
grams down to levels far outside previous experience. Brown’s  (1956) esti- 79  Fiscal Policy in the Shadow of the Great Depression 
mates were the first to show that fiscal stimulus on a full-employment basis, as 
opposed to automatic stabilizers, was rare during the Great Depression. Com- 
pared to a Great Depression that at its nadir involved a 40 percent reduction in 
output relative to potential, the 1 or 2 percent of GDP full-employment deficits 
of the mid-1930s delivered very little discretionary fiscal stimulus. 
By the second Roosevelt administration  the government had begun to make 
a virtue of necessity, and to trumpet the potential fiscal advantages of unbal- 
anced budgets. As Stein (1969) points out, the widespread belief in this politi- 
cally palatable doctrine came well before the spread of the Keynesian tools of 
analysis that were to provide it with a respectable theory. Note that the title of 
Stein’s book is not  the Keynesian  Revolution but the Fiscal  Revolution  in 
America; for the fiscal revolution, the acceptance of  deficit spending as an 
appropriate depression-fighting tool, was largely accomplished in America be- 
fore the arrival of Keynesian doctrines. 
2.3  The Keynesian Age 
2.3.1  The Employment Act of  1946 
The Employment Act of  1946 
established Congress’s Joint Economic Committee, 
established the Council of Economic Advisers, 
called on the president to estimate and forecast the current and future 
level of economic activity in the United States and announced that it 
was the “continuing policy and responsibility” of the federal govern- 
ment to “coordinate and utilize all its plans, functions, and resources 
. . . to foster and promote free competitive enterprise and the general 
welfare; conditions under which there will be afforded useful employ- 
ment for those able, willing, and seeking to work; and to promote maxi- 
mum  employment, production, and  purchasing  power” (see Heller 
1966; Bailey 1950). 
Did it commit the government to the business of  managing the macroeco- 
nomy? Perhaps. But recall that the 1978 Humphrey-Hawkins Act committed 
the federal government to reducing the unemployment rate to 4 percent by 
1983 and to maintaining  it thereafter; committed the federal government to 
reducing the inflation rate to zero by  1988, and required the chairman of the 
Federal Reserve to testify before Congress twice a year on the state of  the 
macroeconomy.  The Humphrey-Hawkins  Act has had no effects-save  to trig- 
ger  the  semiannual Humphrey-Hawkins testimony of  the Federal Reserve 
chair. 
On the other hand, sometimes we refer to laws as boundary stones: short- 
hand markers of deeper changes in attitudes and predispositions. In this sense 
the Employment Act of  1946 certainly marked the commitment of the federal 80  J. Bradford De Long 
government to the macroeconomic management business. As introduced, the 
Full Employment Act required the president to submit a National Production 
and Employment Budget (NPEB) that “assure[ed] a full employment volume 
of production” in the followingfiscal year-a  fiscal year that would begin ap- 
proximately six months after the submission of the NPEB. Congress does not 
move that fast; as written, the Full Employment  Act could not have been imple- 
mented. 
As enacted, the Employment Act called for an annual economic report “set- 
ting forth .  . . current and foreseeable trends in the levels of employment, pro- 
duction, and purchasing power . . . and a program for carrying out the policy” 
of the federal government to promote ”conditions under which there will be 
afforded useful employment for those able, willing, and seeking to work.” The 
enacted bill is not a cause but a signal of the federal government’s commitment 
to macroeconomic management. However, it is a powerful signal.* 
2.3.2  Post-World  War I1 Automatic Stabilizers 
Belief that automatic stabilizers have a significant effect on business cycle 
variability depends on the arguable proposition that liquidity constraints are 
pervasive in the economy (see De Long and Summers 1986). The procycli- 
cality of taxes and transfers can work to reduce the size of recessions only if a 
significant fraction of consumers depend at the margin on their disposable in- 
come to finance their spending. Granting that movements in disposable income 
have  significant effects on consumption, the shift over the past 70 years in 
the cyclical behavior of the federal budget considered as a sea anchor for the 
economy’s level of total spending is impressive. 
A good deal of this increase in the magnitude of automatic stabilizers comes 
from the increase in the size of the government as a share of national product. 
The post-World  War I1 federal government taxes and spends one-fifth or more 
of national product in peacetime. The depression-era federal government taxed 
5-7  percent and spent 8-10  percent of  national product. The predepression 
federal government taxed and spent 5 percent of national product in peak 
peacetime periods. In other periods-the  first peacetime presidency of Wood- 
row Wilson, for example-federal  revenues and federal expenditures were lit- 
tle more than one-fiftieth of national product (see fig. 2.7). 
8. The Employment Act of 1946 also created the Council of Economic Advisers. But its creation 
of the CEA as we know it today-one  chair, two deputies, and a senior staff of  15, almost invari- 
ably drawn from and planning to return to the professoriate-is  best described as an accident. The 
original proposal was for an expansion of the Budget Bureau, or perhaps for an “Office of the 
Director of the National Budget.” My reading of the legislative history is that the Truman adminis- 
tration dropped the ball on issues of Executive Office of the President organization on which it 
ought to have had strong views, and that Congress-I  believe incorrectly-saw  use of the Senate’s 
advise-and-consent  power (along with the existence of  an economic policy appropriation  line 
item) as tools it could use to influence macroeconomic policy. The institution building of primarily 
Arthur Bums and secondarily Walter Heller gave the CEA the recruitment and staffing patterns 
that it has today. 81  Fiscal Policy in the Shadow of the Great Depression 
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Fig. 2.7  Unemployment and the deficit, 1950-95 
Sources; U.S. Bureau of  the Census (1975), CEA (1996), and author’s estimates. 
With a large federal government, automatic stabilizers can easily be large: a 
2.5 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate associated with a 5 
percent fall in output relative to previous forecasts would “automatically” pro- 
duce a deficit of  1 percent of national product if revenues and spending are 
one-fifth of national product, even if revenues have a unit elasticity with respect 
to shocks to production, and even if expenditures do not rise in response to 
unexpected increases in unemployment. When revenues are only 6 percent of 
national product, the smaller size of the government alone makes automatic 
stabilizers only one-third as large. And when, as before the Great Depression, 
both spending and revenues are 5 percent of national product or less, it is hard 
to see how automatic stabilizers could have any macroeconomic significance. 
Table 2.1 presents simple regressions of the level of the government’s fiscal 
balance as a share of national product on the unemployment rate (for 1890- 
19 16, the nonfarm unemployment rate). Think of these regressions as summary 
statistics for how fiscal policy stabilized the economy, either through automatic 
stabilizers that were allowed to operate (and not offset by moves toward budget 
balance in recession) or by legislated changes in fiscal policy. 
The pre-World  War  I period shows little sign of automatic stabilizers: the 
small size of federal spending prohibits the deficit from acting as a sea anchor 
to stabilize the economy. Thus, post-World  War I1 fiscal policy has been very 
different from what it would have been in the absence of the Great Depression. 
The growth in domestic federal spending can be traced to the expectations of 
the proper role of government and the social insurance state set in motion by 
the Great Depression. And it is hard to imagine that automatic stabilizers of 82  J. Bradford De Long 
Table 2.1  Regressions of Federal Budget Balance as  a Share of GDP on the 
Unemployment Rate 
Unemployment  Post-1982 
Period  Rate  Period  R2  SEE 
~~  ~~ 
1890-1916”  -0.083  0.257  0.002 
1920-40  -0.317  0.847  0.010 
1950-95  -0.894  0.526  0.013 




(0,127)  (0.004) 
”Using nonfarm unemployment only 
the magnitude engendered by  this growth in government would have been al- 
lowed to function, were it not for the shadow of the Great Depression. 
2.3.3  Discretionary Fiscal Policy 
It is difficult to argue that “discretionary” fiscal policy has played any stabi- 
lizing role at all in the post-World  War I1 period (see Gordon 1980; De Long 
and Summers 1986).  Even Walter Heller could find only one case of successful 
discretionary  stabilization  policy-the  Kennedy-Johnson  tax  cut  (Heller 
1966). Recessions of the size seen in the post-World  War I1 era are not antici- 
pated, are not forecasted, and develop quickly. Economic policymakers are 
working with shaky data from one quarter or so in the past. The legislative 
process takes at least two or three quarters. Appropriated funds require at least 
two more quarters before they can be spent on any substantial scale. And by 
that time the “need” for economic stimulus has passed. 
The U.S. government simply lacks the knowledge to design and the institu- 
tional capacity to exercise discretionary fiscal policy in response to any macro- 
economic cycle of shorter duration than the Great Depression itself. 
By contrast, automatic stabilizers swing into action within the current quar- 
ter. A fall in incomes leads to a shortfall in revenues-and  an increase in the 
deficit-as  soon as witholdings reach the Federal Reserve. It is difficult to 
imagine how alternative policy instruments could deliver such a within-the- 
quarter response to shifts in spending and employment. 
Thus, a sensible rule of thumb to adopt for fiscal policy would be the recom- 
mendation of  the CED: let the economy’s automatic stabilizers work unhin- 
dered and set the cyclically adjusted full-employment or high-employment 
deficit at whatever level is felt to be consistent with views on the desirable 
long-run level of national savings. Indeed, for the first generation or so after 
World War I1 economists’ and politicians’ views did appear to be converging 
on this position. But the second post-World  War I1 generation saw the disap- 
pearance of  all possible consensus. The 1980s saw the unbalancing of  fiscal 
policy, as slowed bracket creep from the fall in inflation, rising defense spend- 83  Fiscal Policy in the Shadow of the Great Depression 
ing, and broad-based tax cuts together produced large deficits not just in reces- 
sions but in expansions as well. The 1980s saw the reversal of the peacetime 
rule that the debt-to-GDP ratio fell: the debt-to-GDP ratio rose from near 25 
percent at the end of the 1970s to 50 percent by the early 1990s. 
2.4  Long-Run Effects of Short-Run Policies 
There is an argument that use of  fiscal policy as a stabilization tool has 
had harmful side effects. Buchanan and Wagner (1977) argue that deficits are 
dangerous because voters are highly myopic: when  spending is raised and 
taxes are raised to finance the extra government spending, voters feel both the 
pain of reduced after-tax incomes and the benefits of spending programs and 
can judge whether the one is worth the other; but when spending is raised and 
financed by borrowing, voters feel the benefits from spending but do not sense 
the true resource cost of added indebtedness. 
The consequence, Buchanan and Wagner argue, is a government that en- 
gages in spending programs that at the margin do not provide social benefits 
equal to their resource costs. Democratic politics applied to government spend- 
ing functions well only as long as deficits are effectively prohibited. Argu- 
ments that deficit spending could be used for stabilization managed, in Bu- 
chanan and Wagner’s view, to undermine the polity’s immune system, which 
had prevented the emergence of borrow-and-spend as a standard operating pro- 
cedure of political parties. And the adoption of borrow-and-spend as a policy 
threatens to have evil consequences for economic growth: in the United States, 
at least, there is no sign that any increase in the government’s deficit sets in 
motion  an endogenous rise in private savings to offset the fall in national 
wealth accumulation. 
It is hard to look back at America’s federal deficit since 1980 (see Auerbach 
1994) without concluding that there is a good deal of truth in Buchanan and 
Wagner’s argument. “Cyclical deficit: good, structural deficit: bad” appears to 
be a message that is just a little bit too hard for the political nation to grasp. 
2.5  Conclusion 
Before the Great Depression the U.S. government borrowed in time of war 
and ran peacetime surpluses to pay off war debt. The use of  the government 
deficit as a tool of macroeconomic management was rarely considered, and- 
if  considered-was  rejected as inconsistent with international exchange rate 
arrangements. 
The depression broke this pattern: both Hoover and Roosevelt wished to 
maintain surpluses, but both recoiled at the austerity required in the midst of 
the depression. In the end, the political nation made a virtue of  necessity: it 
concluded that deficits in time of  recession helped alleviate the downturn. 
Later on, a theoretical rationale-John  Maynard Keynes’s General Theory- 
was advanced to provide underpinnings for this shift in policy. But in Herbert 84  J. Bradford De Long 
Stein’s formulation, the fiscal revolution in America was broader based than 
and was completed before the Keynesian revolution. 
In the generation after World War 11,  economists and politicians moved to- 
ward a consensus view of fiscal policy: set tax rates and expenditure plans so 
that the high-employment budget would be in surplus, but do not take any steps 
to neutralize automatic stabilizers set in motion by  recession. Set the high- 
employment budget surplus or deficit to conform to views about the desired 
impact of the federal budget on national saving over the business cycle. Do not 
attempt to aggressively use discretionary fiscal policy because the lags make 
it impossible to do so in an effective manner. 
But the American political system could not hold more than one idea in its 
mind at a time. The idea that cyclical deficits in recession could be good has 
weakened the belief that structural deficits that permanently reduce the na- 
tional savings rate are bad. Some share of the deficits that began under Ronald 
Reagan’s presidency is attributable to the shadow of the Great Depression. And 
it may turn out that fear of continued structural deficits has undermined support 
for allowing fiscal automatic stabilizers to work smoothly: few who advocate 
balanced budget amendment proposals think about the implications of such 
proposals for stabilization policy. Thus, the shadow cast over fiscal policy by 
the Great Depression may be fading. 
A world in which the Great Depression had not cast its shadow over post- 
World War I1 fiscal policy would be a different world. It might be a world in 
which many post-World War I1 macroeconomists called themselves Hayekians 
rather than Keynesians, discoursed on “monetary overinvestment,” and argued 
that deep recessions were a necessary price for the dynamic growth efficiencies 
of market-led economic development. It might be a world in which many gov- 
ernments responded to depressions by cutting spending and raising tax rates to 
keep the budget in balance and so prevent investors from losing confidence 
and making the depression worse. 
In  such a world an outbreak of  inflation-like  that seen in the  1970s- 
would have been highly unlikely. In such a world a repeat of the Great Depres- 
sion would have been somewhat more likely. To the extent that the social and 
economic costs of the outbreak of  inflation in the 1970s were low relative to 
the probability and cost of another episode like the Great Depression, we are 
indeed fortunate that post-World  War  I1 fiscal policy has been made in the 
shadow of the Great Depression. 
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